Criteria for Issue Validity

This guide aims to provide clarity for both Watsons & protocols on various categories of issues that are valid under Sherlock's judging. Sherlock is exclusively focused on high and medium-severity findings, as these vulnerabilities will cause a loss of user funds and most materially damage the reputation of the protocols Sherlock seeks to protect.

I. Table of Contents:

II. Criteria for Issue Severity:

(repealed; see IV. How to identify a high issue: and V. How to identify a medium issue: for details)

III. Sherlock's standards:

Subjectivity: Despite these guidelines, we must understand that because of the complexity & subjective nature of smart contract security, there may be issues that are judged beyond the purview of this guide. However, for the vast majority of cases, this guide should suffice. Sherlock's chosen judges continue to have the last word on considering any issue as valid or not.
Hierarchy of truth: If the protocol team provides no specific information, the default guidelines always apply.
If the protocol team includes specific information in the README or CODE COMMENTS, that information may be used as context during the judging process. In cases where there is a contradiction between the README and CODE COMMENTS, the README should be considered the primary source of truth.
The judge can decide that CODE COMMENTS are outdated. In that case, the default guidelines apply.
Example: The code comments state that "a swap can never fail" even though the code is built to support failing swaps.
The protocol team can use the README (and only the README) to define language that indicates the codebase's restrictions and/or expected functionality. Additionally, the protocol team can use only the following question to define the protocol's invariants/properties:
What properties/invariants do you want to hold even if breaking them has a low/unknown impact?
Issues that break the invariants from the above question, irrespective of whether the impact is low/unknown, could be assigned Medium severity if it doesn't conflict with common sense. High severity will be applied only if the issue falls into the High severity category in the judging guidelines.
Example: The README states "Admin can only call XYZ function once" but the code allows the Admin to call XYZ function twice; this is a valid Medium
Example: The README states "Variable X must always match USDC amount in the contract" and a user can donate USDC to break that invariant without causing issues to the protocol; this is an invalid issue
The Sherlock Judge can use public statements up until 24h before the contest ends to override the language in the chosen source of truth.
If guidelines are updated, the new guidelines apply only to contests that start after the date of change. Please check Criteria Changelog for information on the latest changes in the judging guidelines.
Historical decisions are not considered sources of truth.
Could Denial-of-Service (DOS), griefing, or locking of contracts count as Medium (or High) severity issue? To judge the severity we use two separate criteria:
1. The issue causes funds to be locked for more than a week.
2. The issue impacts the availability of time-sensitive functions (cutoff functions are not considered time-sensitive).
If at least one of these is describing the case, the issue can be Medium. If both apply, the issue can be considered High severity. Additional constraints related to the issue may decrease its severity accordingly.
If a single occurrence of the attack results in a denial of service (DOS) for only one block, it is classified as a one-block DOS, even if it can be repeated indefinitely. It qualifies as a medium-level issue only if it disrupts a clearly time-sensitive function.
(External) Admin trust assumptions: If a protocol defines restrictions on the owner/admin, issues involving attacks that bypass these restrictions may be considered valid. These restrictions must be explicitly stated and will be assessed case by case. Admin functions are generally assumed to be used correctly.
Note: if the (external) admin will unknowingly cause issues, it can be considered a valid issue.
Example: Admin sets fee to 200%. The issue "Admin can break deposit by setting fee to a 100%+" is invalid as it's common sense that fees can not be more than 100% on a deposit.
Example: Admin sets fee to 20%. This will cause liquidations to fail in case the utilization ratio is below 10%, this can be Medium as the admin is not aware of the consequences of his action.
Contract Scope:
1. If a contract is in contest Scope, then all its parent contracts are included by default.
2. In case the vulnerability exists in a library and an in-scope contract uses it and is affected by this bug this is a valid issue.
3. If there is a vulnerability in a contract from the contest repository but is not included in the scope then issues related to it cannot be considered valid.
Design decisions are not valid issues. Even if the design is suboptimal, but doesn't imply any loss of funds, these issues are considered informational.

IV. How to identify a high issue:

Direct loss of funds without (extensive) limitations of external conditions. The loss of the affected party must be significant.

Guidelines for Significant Loss:

Users lose more than 1% and more than $10 of their principal.
Users lose more than 1% and more than $10 of their yield.
The protocol loses more than 1% and more than $10 of the fees.

V. How to identify a medium issue:

Causes a loss of funds but requires certain external conditions or specific states, or a loss is highly constrained. The loss must be relevant to the affected party.
Breaks core contract functionality, rendering the contract useless or leading to loss of funds that's relevant to the affected party.

Note: If a single attack can cause a 0.01% loss but can be replayed indefinitely, it will be considered a 100% loss and can be medium or high, depending on the constraints.

Guidelines for Relevant Loss:

Users lose more than 0.01% and more than $10 of their principal.
Users lose more than 0.01% and more than $10 of their yield.
The protocol loses more than 0.01% and more than $10 of the fees.

VI. Recommendations:

A PoC (Proof of Concept) is recommended for issues in any of the following categories to avoid placing the burden of proof on the judge:

Non-obvious issues with complex vulnerabilities or attack paths
Issues with non-trivial input constraints, to demonstrate the attack is feasible despite them
Issues involving precision loss
Reentrancy attacks
Attacks related to gas consumption or reverting message calls

Additionally, Watsons are strongly encouraged to specify all conditions required to trigger the issue and to clarify scenarios where these constraints may apply.

If the original report does not include a Proof of Concept (PoC), it will be considered invalid if the issue cannot be clearly understood without one.

VII. List of Issue categories that are not considered valid:

Gas optimizations: The user/protocol ends up paying a little extra gas because of this issue.
Incorrect Event values: Incorrectly calculated/wrong values in emitted events are not considered valid medium or high.
Zero address checks: Check to make sure input values are not zero addresses.
User input validation: User input validation to prevent user mistakes is not considered a valid issue. However, if a user input could result in a major protocol malfunction or significant loss of funds for other parties (protocol or other users) it could be a valid high. Example(Valid)
Admin Input/call validation:
1. Admin could have an incorrect call order. Example: If an Admin forgets to setWithdrawAddress() before calling withdrawAll() This is not a valid issue.
2. An admin action can break certain assumptions about the functioning of the code. Example: Pausing a collateral causes some users to be unfairly liquidated or any other action causing loss of funds. This is not considered a valid issue.
Contract / Admin Address Blacklisting / Freezing: If a protocol's smart contracts or admin addresses get added to a "blacklist" and the functionality of the protocol is affected by this blacklist, this is not considered a valid issue. However, there could be cases where an attacker would use a blacklisted address to cause harm to a protocol functioning. Example(Valid)
Front-running initializers: Front-running initializers where there is no irreversible damage or loss of funds & the protocol could just redeploy and initialize again is not a valid issue.
User experience issues: Issues causing only minor inconvenience without fund loss, such as temporarily inaccessible funds recoverable by the admin, are not valid.
User Blacklist: User getting blacklisted by a token/contract causing harm only to themselves is not a valid medium/high.
Issues assuming future opcode gas repricing are not considered to be of Medium/High severity. Use of call vs transfer will be considered as a protocol design choice if there is no good reason why the call may consume more than 2300 gas without opcode repricings.
Accidental ETH/native token transfers Merely because a contract allows it, are not valid as medium/high issues.
Loss of airdrops or any other rewards that are not part of the original protocol design is not considered a valid high/medium. Example
Use of Storage gaps: Simple contracts with one of the parent contract not implementing storage gaps are considered low/informational. Exception: However, if the protocol design has a highly complex and branched set of contract inheritance with storage gaps inconsistently applied throughout and the submission clearly describes the necessity of storage gaps it can be considered a valid medium. Example
Incorrect values in View functions are by default considered low. Exception: In case any of these incorrect values returned by the view functions are used as a part of a larger function which would result in loss of funds then it would be a valid medium/high depending on the impact.
Chainlink round completeness Recommendations to implement round completeness or stale price checks are invalid.
In an update contest, issues from the previous contest with wont fix labels are not considered valid.
Chain re-org and network liveness issues are not valid.
ERC721 unsafe mint: Issues where users cannot safemint ERC721 tokens due to unsupported implementation are not valid. Example: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-03-teller-judging/issues/8
Future issues: Issues that result out of a future integration/implementation that was not mentioned in the docs/README or because of a future change in the code (as a fix to another issue) are not valid issues.
Non-Standard tokens: Issues related to tokens with non-standard behaviors, such as weird-tokens are not considered valid by default unless these tokens are explicitly mentioned in the README. Tokens with decimals between 6 and 18 are not considered weird.
Using Solidity versions that support EVM opcodes that don't work on networks on which the protocol is deployed is not a valid issue beacause one can manage compilation flags to compile for past EVM versions on newer Solidity versions.
Sequencers are assumed to operate reliably without misbehavior or downtime. Vulnerabilities or attacks that rely on sequencers going offline or malfunctioning are invalid.

VIII. List of Issue categories that are considered valid:

Slippage related issues showing a direct loss of funds with a detailed explanation for the same can be considered valid high
EIP Compliance: For issues related to EIP compliance, the protocol & codebase must show that there are important external integrations that would require strong compliance with the EIP's implemented in the code. The EIP must be in regular use or in the final state for EIP implementation issues to be considered valid
Identifies the core issue: In case of issues that have a large number of duplicates, Issues that identify the core issue and show valid loss of funds should be grouped.
Out of Gas: Issues that result in Out of Gas errors either by the malicious user filling up the arrays or there is a practical call flow that results in OOG can be considered a valid medium or in cases of blocking all user funds forever maybe a valid high. Exception: In case the array length is controlled by the trusted admin/owner or the issue describes an impractical usage of parameters to reach OOG state then these submissions would be considered as low.
Chainlink Price Checks: Issues related to minAnswer and maxAnswer checks on Chainlink's Price Feeds are considered medium only if the Watson explicitly mentions the price feeds (e.g. USDC/ETH) that require this check.

IX. Duplication guidelines:

The duplication guidelines assume we have a "target issue", and the "potential duplicate" of that issue needs to meet the following requirements to be considered a duplicate.

Identify the root cause
Identify at least a Medium impact
Identify a valid attack path or vulnerability path

Only when the "potential duplicate" meets all three requirements will the "potential duplicate" be duplicated with the "target issue", and all duplicates will be awarded the highest severity identified among the duplicates.

Otherwise, if the "potential duplicate" doesn't meet all requirements, the "potential duplicate" will not be duplicated but could still be judged any other way (solo, a duplicate of another issue, invalid, or any other severity)

Root cause groupings

If the following issues appear in multiple places, even in different contracts. In that case, they may be considered to have the same root cause.

Issues with the same logic mistake.
Example: uint256 is cast to uint128 unsafely.
Issues with the same conceptual mistake.
Example: different untrusted external admins can steal funds.
Issues in the category
- Slippage protection
- Reentrancy
- Access control
- Front-run / sandwich ( issue A that identifies a front-run and issue B that identifies a sandwich can be duplicated )

If the underlying code implementations, impact or fixes are different, then they may be treated separately.

For the root cause categories above, the duplication should be based on the following groups:

Reentrancy:
- Reenter in the same function;
- Cross function reentrancy (in a different function inside the contract);
- Cross contract reentrancy (in a different contract within the codebase);
- Read-only reentrancy.
- Cross-chain reentrancy.
If several reports find different scenarios for the same type of reentrancy within the codebase, they should be considered to have the same root cause.
Front-running/sandwich/slippage protection:
- Can be fixed by slippage protection;
- Can be fixed by a commit-reveal mechanism (e.g. the user front-runs the admin, who's trying to blacklist them).

X. Best practices:

Read the contest readme and documents thoroughly.
Submit issues that are considered valid according to Sherlock guidelines based on your discretion
Do not submit multiple issues in a single submission. Even if the 2 completely different issues occur on the same line, please make sure to separately submit them. Below is a valid example where multiple occurrences can be combined into one issue: Example. Also, there could be multiple occurrences of an issue but they may need to be submitted separately as each occurrence need not be an obvious repetition like the safeTransfer example. Watsons must use their own discretion in such cases.
Be specific and sufficiently descriptive when describing an issue's impact. Bad: Loss of funds for the user Good: Loss of funds for users as there is no access control for the ‘withdraw’ function
Do not add unnecessarily long code snippets into the submission. Keep the code snippet limited to the scope of the impact, and be as descriptive as possible in the Vulnerability Detail sections.
Do not copy-paste issues from other contests/reports/past audits. They are extremely unlikely to be valid to the respective contest.

This guide shall be regularly updated as more contests are judged and with evolving Smart contract security principles, the judging standards are subject to change over time.

XI. Glossary

Attack Path: A sequence of steps or actions a malicious actor takes to cause losses or grief to the protocol or users and/or gain value or profit.

Front-run: There is operation A; if executed, it typically has no losses for anyone. If some other operation B executes before A, either in the same transaction or a separate transaction, there is a loss of some sort for either the protocol or some user(s) (it can be the same user)

Root Cause: The primary factor or a fundamental reason that imposes an unwanted outcome

Sandwich: A front-run, followed by operation C controlled by the attacker who also executed operation B. The goal of operation C is to revert the contract to its initial state.

Vulnerability Path: A sequence of steps showcasing how an issue causes losses or grief to the protocol or users through well-intended usage of the protocol.

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